Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the dictator of Belarus, has long utilized political prisoners as a means of leverage and bargaining with the West. His maneuver has always active releasing prisoners in exchange for easing sanctions, securing economical aid, and improving his or the country’s image before presidential elections and key global meetings and discussions. During the 2000s and 2010s, Belarus, erstwhile a crucial player in the east Partnership programme, managed to balance its relationships with both Russia and the West across economic, geopolitical and cultural dimensions. At that time, the Belarusian dreams of low-cost airlines operating from Minsk Airport and a simplified visa government with the EU appeared feasible, while the number of political prisoners in the country remained below a hundred.
Currently, the situation is dire and seemingly unsolvable: there are around 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus at the moment, and six have already died in custody. Belarus’s hybrid activities at the EU’s external border; the hijacking of a Ryanair plane; its unprecedented repression and crackdown on Belarusian society; the exodus of an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 people; and its function in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have all rendered it a non-negotiable entity, treated on par with Russia. As a result, an eighth circular of sanctions were imposed in July 2024. The spotlight on Belarus in 2020 has waned, leaving it nearly absent from EU discussions. As Belarus falls off the bloc’s radar and heads toward its 2025 presidential elections, the pressing question now is: what can be done to guarantee that political prisoners in Belarus are not dying in silence there while waiting for a fresh circular of bargaining?
Belarusian pattern of exchanging freedom
The most notable cases of Lukashenka’s bargaining over political prisoners are those of Alexander Kazulin and Nikolai Statkevich. Both cases are related to the 2006 and 2010 presidential elections. In 2006, Belarusian voters had 4 candidates to choose from, including Kazulin, the leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic organization and erstwhile Belarusian State University rector.
On July 13th 2006, nearly 4 months after the election, Kazulin was sentenced to 5 and a half years in prison for his function in post-election protests. In response, the US and EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Belarusian officials active in electoral fraud and human rights abuses. With Kazulin among many another political prisoners inactive incarcerated, the US raised the stakes by sanctioning Belneftekhim in November 2007. 3 months later, Belarus released six detainees considered prisoners of conscience by the West, though Kazulin remained imprisoned. After the first detainees walked free, Lukashenka openly said that now “is the turn of the European Union to show its good intentions”. However, the US responded by extending sanctions to all state enterprises in Belarus’s petrochemical sector, citing the failure to release Kazulin. Kazulin was yet released in August 2008, and shortly after 2 more political prisoners were freed from prison. This led to, as the UK ambassador to Minsk stated, “the absence of any internationally recognised political prisoners in Belarus”. Following this, the EU conditionally suspended any sanctions and the US eased restrictions on certain types of engagement and assistance.
An optimistic stance regarding possible reforms rapidly faded following the presidential elections held in December 2010 and the subsequent crackdown on Belarusian society. Following the announcement of the election results on December 19th 2010, a large protest broke out in central Minsk. The authorities responded by imposing severe sentences on the protesters and accused organizers, including presidential candidate Nikolai Statkevich, who was sentenced to six years in prison.
To hold the Belarusian government accountable for human rights violations, the EU and the US imposed and intensified sanctions, utilizing Statkevich’s situation to justify the measures. The first sanctions included travel bans and asset freezes; an arms embargo; the suspension of high-level diplomatic contacts; trade restrictions; export controls; and measures against circumstantial enterprises in the petrochemical sector. Throughout 2011 and beyond, the EU and US continually reassessed sanctions, emphasizing that the release of all political prisoners was a prerequisite for any simplification of the measures. As the 2015 presidential elections approached, economical difficulties stemming from reliance on Russia and the impact of sanctions, along with the request to bolster legitimacy and Belarus’s emerging function as a mediator in the Ukraine-Russia war, made dialog with the West and possible sanctions relief more plausible. On August 22nd 2015, just months before the elections, Lukashenka unexpectedly ordered the release of Statkevich and respective another political prisoners, setting the phase for the EU to temporarily suspend most of its restrictive measures and for the US to reduce its sanctions.
Contrasting eras
Indeed, the state of affairs in Belarus and its global context in 2024 contrast sharply with those of 2008 and 2015, erstwhile Kazulin and Statkevich were released and specified bargaining seemed like a win-win script for both the West and Minsk. Since the beginning of the 2020 presidential campaign, over 50,000 people have been detained on political grounds in Belarus, with more than 3,380 recognized as political prisoners. Although about 2,000 prisoners have completed their sentences and been released, prisons proceed to fill with fresh political detainees. The year 2023 marked the highest number of “political” criminal convictions at 1,603.
Only a tiny fraction of political prisoners were released before completing their sentences, and these cases frequently occurred due to the diplomatic actions of another nations. In October 2020, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s intervention led to the release of Vitaly Shklyarov, an American political strategist with US citizenship, who had been arrested in Belarus shortly before the country’s presidential elections. Israeli president Isaac Herzog’s call in December 2021 secured the release of Maya Reiten, arrested for cannabis possession. Although not a political prisoner, efforts to free Reiten active individual appeals from the Israeli authorities, highlighting the possible impact of direct diplomatic intervention. In February 2022, Switzerland, through diplomatic channels and the accreditation of its ambassador to Belarus, managed to secure the release of Natallia Hersche, a dual Swiss-Belarusian citizen.
Another notable case is that of Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus, who was allowed to return to the country in December after being denied entry in August 2020. His return was made possible following a gathering between a Vatican envoy and Lukashenka in Minsk just before Christmas Eve.
Though most of these releases occurred before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the release of Sofia Sapega, a Russian national, is an exception. This is due to the fact that it happened in June 2023, 15 months after the invasion, thanks to a individual request from the politician of Primorsky Krai.
Warsaw and Vilnius
While expected to bring clarity and set an agenda for addressing issues related to Belarus and its political prisoners on the global stage, the Belarusian democratic movement and civilian society in exile, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, have struggled to do so. They are divided not only geographically between Vilnius and Warsaw but besides strategically on the issue of political prisoners — whether to do everything possible to safe their release, including the already established practice of bargaining with Lukashenka, or to proceed pressuring the government by opposing any “trading” of prisoners and advocating for additional sanctions to force the government to release them 1 day.
The coexistence of specified starkly opposing viewpoints within Belarus’s democratic forces hampers effective interior dialog and creates a request for the issue of prisoner release to be ignored. The West perceives this interior conflict to formulate and advance a unified strategy as detrimental, and, incapable to invest the time needed to unravel the complexities of the political prisoner issue, is hesitant to engage with Lukashenka, who holds the keys to the prisons.
The August 1st exchange partially reflects western partners’ insufficient motivations to negociate the release of Belarusian political prisoners. While the exchange included German citizen Rico Krieger, who was sentenced to death in Belarus and later granted amnesty by Lukashenka, no Belarusian political prisoners were released. Despite the presence of respective abroad nationals in Belarusian prisons — including Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian citizens, as well as Belarusians linked to western countries like Maria Kalesnikava to Germany — and the possible for including Belarusian political prisoners, the democratic forces were not informed by their western colleagues about the prisoner exchange, unlike their Russian counterparts.
Wake-up call
In all the cases described above, as well as in the release of 5 political prisoners with Ukrainian citizenship from Belarusian prisons in June this year, the precedence was to facilitate their liberation without any complicated preconditions to sit down at the negotiating table. In the case of the August 1st exchange, even the artificially created death punishment conviction for Rico Krieger by Belarusian authorities as a means to force Germany into releasing the Russian state assassin Vadim Krasikov; or the death of Alexei Navalny in the Russian Arctic, who was expected to be released as part of this exchange; did not impede the accomplishment of this exceptionally intricate multinational agreement. Western leaders and negotiators exhibited patience, unity, humility and firmness, resulting in Putin making concessions (with Moscow releasing twice as many people as the West). This was previously deemed impossible. It is now essential to focus on Russia’s western neighbour, Belarus, and to show the same degree of unity, determination, humanism and designation of the priceless value of human life.
Signals from Minsk that could be interpreted as invitations to the negotiating table have appeared multiple times in 2024, with their frequency and clarity expanding recently. On July 2nd 2024, Lukashenka signed the “Amnesty Law in Connection with the 80th Anniversary of Belarus’s Liberation from Nazi Invaders”. Like erstwhile amnesty laws, it excluded political prisoners. Despite this, 18 political prisoners were released, including the 67-year-old cancer-stricken politician and 2010 presidential candidate Ryhor Kastusyou. Meanwhile, human rights organizations reported that political prisoners nationwide are being compelled to compose pleas for clemency. This improvement may be linked to fresh statements by ultimate Court president Valentin Sukalo, who noted that further clemency measures are under consideration for those convicted in the 2020 protests. Lukashenka will personally make these decisions. This is unprecedented, as clemency for these individuals had previously seemed impossible.
In late July 2024, the Polish RadioZet reported that Poland and Belarus were negotiating the release of Andrzej Poczobut, with Warsaw considering crucial measures specified as closing its border crossings with Belarus. These entry points are crucial for Minsk. In addressing why Belarusian political prisoners were not part of the August 1st exchange, Polish abroad Minister Radosław Sikorski mentioned that “efforts to release another political prisoners, including Andrzej Poczobut, are being conducted through different channels.”
While specified statements supply any optimism for a major release of political prisoners in Belarus with western involvement, they should besides service as a wake-up call for western countries including Lithuania, Latvia, Germany and Norway. Lukashenka has made it clear that he will not engage with the democratic forces in exile under any circumstances, regardless of their unified or divided strategy on political prisoners. Thus, western countries request to take the lead, set up their own communication channels with Belarus, and work to guarantee these prisoners are not forgotten. Despite not guaranteeing a bridge between Lukashenka and the democratic forces with the West as an intermediary, the probability that diplomatic efforts will yield better and quicker results is much higher than simply waiting for Lukashenka to start the bargaining himself.
The main takeaway from the August 1st exchange is that erstwhile both sides are willing to negotiate, previously unimaginable outcomes become possible, granting freedom to political prisoners who had lost hope of always being released. However, not everyone may last until specified agreements are finalized, and it is certain that at least six political prisoners in Belarus will not benefit from them. precedence must be given to prevent this number from increasing, as there is nothing more crucial than saving human lives.
Vitali Matyshau is simply a Belarusian civic activist associated with an NGO focused on advocacy, supporting Belarusian political prisoners and their relatives. His academic focus lies primarily in the safety of the east European region and Georgia. He is pursuing a master’s degree in global Relations at NMBU, Norway.
“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is simply a task co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish improvement cooperation of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.
This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the authoritative position of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
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