In late September 2025, a delegation from Abkhazia, Georgia’s Russia-backed breakaway region, travelled to China to participate in the Food2China Expo held in the city of Guangzhou. Supported by the Abkhaz Chamber of Commerce, the delegation showcased local products and signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce, a Chinese state-linked organization.
The visit was more than a trade mission for Abkhazia. Secluded on the global stage, the breakaway territory sees any engagement with China as a possible boost to its legitimacy and an chance to soothe its decades-long economical isolation. Abkhaz media and social networks framed the delegation’s journey as “a strategically crucial step” toward integrating Abkhazia into larger trade networks, even if tangible economical gains stay limited.
In the meantime, the Georgian government continued to court China as its strategical partner. On September 29th, during celebrations in Tbilisi marking the 76th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing’s incumbent ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Qian, reiterated his government’s desire to deepen cooperation with the country. At the same time, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze praised China as “a model for progress”, affirming Georgia’s readiness to grow economical and political cooperation with Beijing.
Amidst Georgia’s U-turn from its EU and NATO ambitions, China represents more than an economical partner for the ruling Georgian Dream party. Under current circumstances, it is increasingly viewed by Tbilisi as a strategical alternate to the West. With strained relations with the EU and the United States, Chinese investments, loans, and infrastructure projects are seen as a lifeline — offering the government both financial support and geopolitical leverage. Tbilisi hopes that Beijing can aid mitigate the economical and political fallout from the country’s fresh distancing from western allies. Yet, China’s dichotomous approach to Georgia may turn what seems like a lifeline into a geopolitical tightrope.
The economical allure
Georgia’s geographic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia has long attracted Chinese attention. The country is an crucial node for the mediate Corridor, a transit way connecting China to European markets that has grown in importance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted much more conventional transport routes in the north.
Chinese firms have invested heavy in Georgian infrastructure over the past decade through logistics projects tied to the Belt and Road Initiative. The 2023 strategical partnership between Tbilisi and Beijing further cemented these ties, prioritizing comprehensive coordination in economic, political and cultural spheres between the 2 countries, signalling Georgia’s ambition to become a major transit corridor between Europe and Asia. By 2022, trade between the 2 countries had grown significantly, making China Georgia’s third-largest economical partner. Projects specified as the Anaklia deepwater port further exemplify the current stakes. Initially planned by the Anaklia improvement Consortium in 2017, the port remains unbuilt. In 2020, Georgian Dream ditched a US-led construction consortium, selecting a Chinese-Singaporean group as the private partner to renew the task in 2024. If completed, the port would strengthen Georgia’s strategical importance within the mediate Corridor, all while bringing a crucial boost to Chinese investment in the country.
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An alternate to the West
Despite the economical promise, Georgia’s relation with China carries crucial political risks. Beijing’s approach is deliberate and carefully calibrated. The Abkhazia memorandum, although mostly symbolic, clearly demonstrates China’s willingness to engage with Tbilisi while quietly maintaining ties with its breakaway regions, avoiding political commitments on Georgia’s territorial integrity. Chinese officials routinely sidestep questions about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the UN, China has even abstained on resolutions concerning the return of Georgia’s internally displaced persons. In practice, this shows Beijing prioritizes its strategical and economical interests over the political goals of the Georgia’s incumbent party.
For the Georgian Dream ruling party, the calculus seems simple yet perilous: by deepening ties with China, Tbilisi hopes to offset declining western support while accelerating economical development. But Beijing’s transactional diplomacy suggests that these gains may come at a advanced price. China’s strategy in Georgia illustrates a “double-edged” approach: strengthening ties with the recognized government while maintaining symbolic or informal engagement with a breakaway region, specified as Abkhazia.
While Tbilisi gains immediate benefits, be it loans and infrastructure, deeper reliance on Beijing may bestow China subtle but strong leverage over the country’s home politics and abroad policy. The ambiguity of Beijing’s engagement underscores a fundamental imbalance: what Georgia perceives as a partnership, China treats as an opportunity. By carefully balancing these moves, Beijing is attempting to maximize its economical influence without committing to the political risks of territorial recognition. Over time, economical gains could evolve into strategical dependency, leaving Tbilisi highly exposed to Chinese political leverage.
The hidden cost
The Georgian Dream organization must so navigate a delicate balance despite its ever-worsening relations with the West. While Chinese investments bring immediate economical benefits and strategical opportunities, they hazard creating long-term dependencies that could limit Tbilisi’s autonomy in abroad policy and home decision-making. The Guangdong memorandum, the Anaklia port, and ongoing infrastructure projects uncover China’s actual calculus regarding its partnership with Tbilisi. Georgian officials may hope that Beijing can service as a reliable alternate to the West, yet the reality is far more complex. Chinese investments and loans are transactional, and the strategical partnership, while beneficial, is based on unequal terms. For Georgia, the question is no longer whether China will invest, but on whose terms. In the long run, short-term economical benefits could translate into long-term political leverage.
Importantly, China’s cautious engagement with Abkhazia, exemplified by the Guangdong memorandum, could subtly affect the breakaway region’s global positioning. While the agreement is mostly symbolic, even limited designation by a Chinese state-affiliated organization may give Abkhazia a marginal boost in legitimacy on the global stage. For Tbilisi, this balancing act highlights the delicate interplay between economical engagement and the possible for incremental shifts in the perception of Abkhazia’s sovereignty.
To navigate this complex relationship, Georgian Dream could consider respective measures. Even though Chinese investment might seem attractive, Georgia should proceed engaging with western partners, regional allies, and multilateral financial institutions to avoid over-reliance on a single country. It should enhance transparency and oversight, maintaining scrutiny of all major deals with China to reduce the hazard of opaque arrangements that could compromise the country’s sovereignty. China’s engagement in Georgia offers both chance and caution. Therefore, balancing short-term economical benefits with long-term strategical autonomy will be paramount for ensuring that its advanced stakes bet does not come at the cost of independence.
Ioseb Dzamukashvili Sekhniashvili is a policy expert with a focus on east Europe, Eurasia and Russia. Previously, he has been a columnist at Forbes Georgia and a contributing policy analyst for the Georgian Foundation for strategical and global Studies. He holds an MA degree from the University of Glasgow.
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