Spór kosowsko-serbski w obliczu globalnych zawirowań: decydujący test dla UE

With the war in Ukraine entering its 4th year and tensions emerging in the transatlantic relationship, the EU finds itself at a pivotal minute in its history. The fresh European Commission is confronted with a myriad of challenges that will form the future of Europe, ranging from economical instability and energy safety to interior divisions and geopolitical tensions.

Among these challenges is besides the long-standing Kosovo-Serbia dispute. While it may appear little pressing in the grand strategy of things, how the EU handles this issue will not only form the stableness of the Western Balkans but besides find the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor. For example, is it capable of enforcing its abroad policy priorities and maintaining safety in its immediate neighbourhood?

The EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialog was launched in 2011 with the intent of normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Since then, there have been periods of both rapprochement and heightened tension, with the Brussels Agreement in 2013 and the Ohrid Agreement in 2023 hailed as major steps towards the normalization of relations. However, both sides have mostly failed to implement the essential agreed measures, leaving the dialog without a final resolution. As a result, tensions have persisted between both sides.

The EU late appointed its fresh peculiar Envoy for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, Peter Sørensen, succeeding Miroslav Lajčák. His task will be twofold: to decision the dialog process forward and rebuild the EU’s function as a credible mediator. However, the current situation is complicated due to an apparent political deadlock between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as increasing transatlantic discord. Despite these challenges, the EU must take decisive action to keep the negotiations on track. This must be done in order to reaffirm its function as the key geopolitical actor in its neighbourhood.

Lajčák’s agreement and unintended effects

In 2020, the EU signalled a renewed commitment to resolving tensions in the region by appointing Miroslav Lajčák as its first peculiar typical for the Belgrade-Pristina dialog and another issues in the Western Balkans. He introduced the Ohrid Agreement in 2023, a fresh normalization framework, nearly a decade after the 2013 Brussels Agreement. Under the Agreement, Kosovo committed to establish an adequate level of self-governance for the Kosovo Serb community in the north, while Serbia agreed to not argue Kosovo’s membership in global organizations. Both parties besides committed to good neighbourly relations, common designation of national symbols and documents, and the exchange of permanent missions, among another measures.

The agreement, however, was only verbally endorsed. Following the gathering in Ohrid, the Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić refused to sign it, arguing that doing so would imply designation of Kosovo’s independence. Shortly after, president Vučić besides openly opposed Kosovo’s UN membership bid, a direct violation of the Agreement. A further setback followed in December 2023, erstwhile then-Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, in a letter to the EU, explicitly stated that Serbia does not consider the Ohrid Agreement legally binding. Vučić and Brnabić have besides noted that Belgrade will not actively comply with certain provisions of the Agreement. Serbia later voted against Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe. In September 2024, the EU claimed Serbia withdrew this letter, but the Serbian government has not confirmed this move.

Since then, no advancement has been made despite many meetings in Brussels. At the same time, multiple incidents have exacerbated safety concerns. Kosovo’s government efforts to dismantle Serbian-run parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo have sparked protests and clashes with the local Serb population. The EU has subsequently imposed restrictive measures that proceed to be in place. In 2023, a Serbian armed group besides attacked the Kosovo police in Banjska. In the following year, attacks were carried out on Kosovo’s critical infrastructure. Both actions were condemned by the EU as acts of terrorism. This ongoing fragile safety situation in the north underscores the urgent request for a sustainable resolution.

A fresh start: Sørensen takes the lead in negotiations

The appointment of Peter Sørensen as the fresh peculiar Envoy marks a fresh start for the Dialogue. Unlike his predecessor Miroslav Lajčák, whose Slovakian background raised questions about his impartiality, Sørensen hails from Denmark, a country that recognizes Kosovo. This shift addresses concerns of possible bias that had previously surrounded the negotiations. A seasoned career diplomat alternatively than a erstwhile politician, Sørensen brings extended experience in both EU and UN roles across the Western Balkans. His deep familiarity with the region, coupled with his deficiency of political affiliations, presents an chance to reinvigorate the dialog process.

Furthermore, while Lajčák’s mandate encompassed both the Belgrade-Pristina dialog and broader Western Balkan regional issues, Sørensen’s function is solely focused on the Dialogue. This reflects a more targeted approach, allowing him to dedicate his full attention to facilitating negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. By narrowing his portfolio, the EU aims to enhance the effectiveness of its mediation efforts, ensuring that the dialog receives the sustained focus and diplomatic resources essential to accomplish tangible progress.

Finally, the shifting political scenery in Serbia and Kosovo offers an chance to advance the Dialogue. In Serbia, mass demonstrations following the collapse of the main train station’s roof in Novi Sad in November 2024 have weakened the current ruling coalition government. To address the accusations of democratic backsliding, Serbian government leaders may want to re-engage with the negotiations to show their commitment to EU integration and values. Meanwhile, although Kosovo’s recent election has not yet led to the formation of a government due to ongoing political tensions, a fresh government is expected to be formed, presenting an chance for renewed engagement. Peter Sørensen should seize this minute to push for a stronger and results-driven framework.

Escaping crisis mode: between priorities and challenges

Sørensen must address critical issues from the outset to bring the dialog back on track. A key precedence is initiating the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, with a clearly defined series of steps for its enforcement. To accomplish this, Sørensen must tackle 2 outstanding challenges. The first is resolving the EU’s continued restrictive measures against Kosovo that were meant to encourage re-engagement with the dialog and incentivize the implementation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities. At the same time, he must convince Serbia to retreat its letter from December 2023 questioning the Ohrid Agreement’s legality to safe Belgrade’s full commitment to the Dialogue. Without addressing these 2 critical issues, the dialog will stay ineffective, as demonstrated throughout 2024.

Sørensen must besides have a contingency plan for the fresh US administration, which could unexpectedly shift its approach in the negotiations. In 2020, the US presidential envoy, Richard Grenell, initiated a parallel dialogue with Kosovo and Serbia. The consequence was the Washington Agreement to normalize economical relations done outside of the scope of the EU-facilitated Dialogue. A akin script could unfold again, and Sørensen must be prepared to navigate possible disruptions while maintaining the EU’s leadership in the process.

Since the war in Ukraine, the EU has acknowledged the geopolitical necessity of EU enlargement not only in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, but besides the Western Balkans. The fresh Commission has promised to deliver advancement in bringing candidate countries closer to the EU. For Serbia and Kosovo, this advancement is conditioned upon the successful normalization of relations. This enlargement momentum presents a unique chance for Sørensen to assert leadership and rally EU associate states behind the successful resolution of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. This would strengthen EU leadership and remove a major barrier to regional stability, moving all six Western Balkan countries further along the way to EU membership.

Maša Ocvirk is the elder Policy Advisor for safety and defence at Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Washington, DC. Originally from Slovenia, she has respective years of experience working in legislative affairs and abroad policy in Brussels and Washington. She has authored many articles on EU abroad policy, transatlantic security, and the Western Balkans.

Visar Xhambazi is simply a researcher, consultant, and task manager based in Washington, DC, with more than a decade of experience in the nonprofit sector. His areas of interest include Euro-Atlantic integration, authoritarian influences in the Western Balkans, regional cooperation, and the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. He presently works as an editor at Sbunker, a nonprofit media organization based in Kosovo, covering politics, economics, culture, and society. In January 2023, he became a associate of the Wilson Center’s Transatlantic Writers’ Group, a platform promoting emerging voices among the next generation of transatlantic policy makers.

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