Cyfrowy koń trojański w wyborach w Rumunii

neweasterneurope.eu 1 miesiąc temu

On 9 March 2025, Romania’s Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) barred far-right populist Călin Georgescu from moving in the May presidential election rerun, sparking clashes between his supporters and police. What might appear as a home controversy carries broader implications for the state of democracy across Europe.

The decision comes after a turbulent election year. In 2024, more than 70 countries went to the polls, with populist forces gaining unexpected traction. While the world’s attention was mostly focused on elections for the European Parliament or the president of the United States, 1 of Romania’s most crucial political revolutions occurred far closer to home. These elections were more than a national affair — they exposed increasing political polarization, weakening organization trust, and the disruptive function of digital disinformation. Georgescu’s exclusion underscores not just legal controversy, but the fragility of democratic processes in a rapidly evolving political landscape.

Romania’s case is part of a wider trend: in an age where algorithms form opinion more than debate, safeguarding democracy requires more than holding elections — it demands protecting the integrity of the public sphere itself.

Everything but Security

Examining Romania’s strategical position on the east flank is key to knowing why it has become a mark for specified threats. NATO’s east defence plan heavy relies on Romania. In 2019, the country announced a 2.5 billion-euro expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base close Constanța, aiming to transform it into NATO’s largest military base in Europe. The task included fresh runways, hangars and barracks to accommodate up to 10,000 NATO troops.

From a military standpoint, Romania holds strategical importance as a frontline NATO state, peculiarly in countering Russian influence in the Black Sea region. The airbase expansion did not go unnoticed; during this time, Russian media outlets began covering the story, primarily emphasizing the possible offensive uses of the base and framing it as a provocative act that could escalate tensions in the region. Moscow responded swiftly erstwhile construction officially began on June 11th 2024. Russian officials voiced concerns almost immediately. Andrei Klimov, deputy president of the Federation Council Committee on global Affairs, called the expansion a “threat to Bucharest,” suggesting the base could become a primary mark in future conflicts. Russia’s typical in arms control negotiations, Konstantin Gavrilov, accused NATO of undermining regional security. Meanwhile, the Russian abroad ministry labelled the improvement as part of NATO’s broader militarization of east Europe, indicating potential consequences. Although these were simply comments from the Russian side at the time, it became clear that Russia was preparing any kind of offensive, albeit in a different way. Coincidentally, at the same time, Romania was preparing for its presidential elections, with higher geopolitical stakes than ever. With Russia knowing how to hijack elections, it decided to usage the power of the media erstwhile again.

During the elections, respective candidates competed for the presidency:

  • Elena Lasconi (Save Romania Union – USR)
  • Marcel Ciolacu (Social Democratic organization – PSD)
  • George Simion (Alliance for the Union of Romanians – AUR)
  • Nicolae Ciucă (National Liberal organization – PNL)
  • Mircea Geoană (Independent)
  • Călin Georgescu (Independent, nationalist)

However, the most unexpected turn of events came from Călin Georgescu, a comparatively unknown figure with no crucial political backing. Georgescu’s abrupt emergence to fame swept across Romania like a whirlwind. comparatively unknown in mainstream politics, he had no organization backing him up, had no visible run presence, and was not mentioned in political debates. However, his name dominated online and in-person discussions in the final weeks before the election, leaving many intrigued by his abrupt popularity. Romanian voters flocked to online forums to express their confusion. Many stated that until his popularity on TikTok, they had no thought who Georgescu was. He lacked organization support and wasn’t well-known in debates. The question is how individual with no prior popularity became so crucial overnight, how he achieved that, and whether Russia is someway linked to it.

The TikTok takeover

Georgescu’s net behaviour reveals a noticeable pattern upon closer examination. knowing TikTok’s algorithm is essential to realize how the platform was leveraged to enhance its reach. To supply a personalized content experience, TikTok’s “For You” page uses an advanced advice algorithm that adapts to user behaviour. The algorithm primarily relies on the following:

User interactions: A video engagement includes likes, shares, comments, and viewing time. fast swipes distant indicate disinterest, but content that captures users’ attention for a longer time is prioritized;

Information about videos: Sounds, visual effects, hashtags, and captions assist in categorizing and matching content with suitable viewers;

Device and account settings: Factors specified as language, location, or device kind do not importantly impact recommendations;

When a fresh video is uploaded, TikTok presents it to a choice fewer viewers to measure its popularity. The platform gradually expands its reach, securing wider visibility if the engagement rate is high. TikTok besides enriches its content by incorporating various video types to prevent users from encountering the same material repeatedly. Users can further tailor their experience and enhance the algorithm’s recommendations by marking videos as “not interested”.

TikTok played a crucial function in Georgescu’s emergence to fame, as the platform saw a sharp increase in engagement with his content in the weeks leading up to the election. According to the data below, the hashtag #călingeorgescu surged during this period. This spike illustrates how TikTok’s algorithm can effectively disseminate political messages and influence public opinion on a large scale.

Source: exolyt.com

A illustration from Exolyt illustrates how Georgescu, previously unknown and barely appearing in popularity rankings, abruptly surged in visibility just weeks before the elections. Călin Georgescu’s popularity has experienced dynamic shifts in fresh months. Network analysis indicates that his name has become central to discussions on politics, activism, and regional issues in mid-November. Notably, the hashtags associated with him are strategically linked to mainstream themes, helping to aid him emergence into the charts across diverse audiences.

Source: exolyt.com (the illustration shows related hashtags in Romania)

A spike in TikTok engagement between November and December marked a highest in his visibility, likely driven by run efforts or viral content. However, this spike was about more than just organic interest. any Romanian TikTok influencers have acknowledged receiving payments for promoting hashtags related to Georgescu, specified as #Presidency2024.

Marius Catlain, who has over 800,000 followers, stated he was paid to advance Georgescu through an app called Fame Up. The another key hashtag utilized was #echilibrusiverticalitate. 1 notable influencer, Alex Stremițeanu, shared his experience of being part of this campaign. He revealed that upon utilizing the hashtag #echilibrusiverticalitate, his TikTok posts were inundated with comments supporting Georgescu, specified as “votăm Călin Georgescu” (“we vote for Călin Georgescu”). Below in the chart, it is shown how this hashtag became popular in TikTok.

Source: exolyt.com

As a result, his poll standings increased. The run employed coordinated hashtags, including #echilibrusiverticalitate, to extend its scope and impact. This hashtag was utilized for Georgescu’s social media strategy, affecting his online presence and public perception. The illustration highlights how this hashtag gained traction. More importantly, it demonstrates how the hashtag was straight linked to Georgescu. The related hashtags showcase Călin Georgescu’s emergence in popularity within the same timeframe.

Source: exolyt.com

However, what made Georgescu’s TikTok run peculiarly compelling was the platform’s implicit facilitation – TikTok did not classify his content as a political campaign, allowing paid influencers to advance him without disclosure. The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) identified TikTok user Bogdan Peşchir (“bog”) as a key financial contributor, donating over 1 million euros to Georgescu’s electoral efforts. Adding to the controversy, Romania’s intelligence agency (SRI) uncovered that TikTok influencers promoting Georgescu were funded through FameUp, a platform designed to monetize online marketing.

Campaign slogans and hashtags appeared out of nowhere and spread like wildfire, and Georgescu went from a political outsider to dominating Romania’s political conversation in just days. The numbers talk for themselves: Romania has 19.5 million registered voters, and according to statistics, around nine million people usage TikTok. The illustration below illustrates the dynamics of TikTok’s mark audience in the Romanian. Primarily, the audience consists of voters.

Source: PiPidas

Georgescu’s TikTok videos amassed 117.2 million views and 7.5 million likes. His digital influence was unprecedented, highlighting online platforms’ immense power – and possible dangers – in modern elections. In November 2024, Călin Georgescu utilized TikTok as a cornerstone of his presidential campaign, promoting a blend of populist nationalism, cultural conservatism, and individual relatability.

This approach reshaped the political discourse and brought his message to younger, digitally engaged voters. Interestingly, the TikTok platform did not classify him as a political candidate. The illustration below shows how his popularity grew throughout November despite his deficiency of content beforehand.

Source: exolyt.com

Georgescu’s run put Romania’s interests front and centre, frequently at the expense of external alliances. He framed national sovereignty as the key to prosperity, stability, and security. In 1 widely shared TikTok video, he declared, “I am moving for Romania, not for Ukraine,” which struck a chord with voters who felt abroad policy had come at the cost of home well-being. Throughout his campaign, he questioned Romania’s close ties with Western institutions, casting uncertainty on whether EU and NATO membership truly benefited the country’s autonomy. Even now, he is very popular across Russian media channels, utilizing the same rhetoric as Russian representatives regarding the fresh NATO base in Romania.

His anti-globalist views resonated with those frustrated by Brussels and Washington, portraying these alliances as barriers to self-determination. He pushed for economical protectionism and opposition to abroad influence, subtly reinforcing his nationalist stance. Outside politics, Georgescu positioned himself as a defender of Orthodox Christian values and Romanian customs. Videos of him attending churches and engaging in conventional customs presented him as a guardian of cultural legacy, which appealed to conservative people troubled about fast modernization and “liberal values”. Simultaneously, he tried to scope younger viewers by offering glimpses of his private life – from morning jogs to judo training. From that point, these videos helped him to seem more approachable with the digital generation and more friendly. utilizing the algorithm, his approach created a dual persona: a applicable figure and a strong, nationalistic leader. This combination helped him bridge generational gaps and grow his support base.

Broader regional trends

More importantly, Georgescu’s run closely resembles strategies observed in erstwhile elections throughout east Europe. For instance, Moldovan candidate Igor Dodon likewise championed Moldova’s sovereignty, frequently opposing closer ties with the EU and advocating for non-alignment to enhance connections with Russia. Both Georgescu and pro-Russian Moldovan candidates capitalized on nationalist sentiments to represent themselves as defenders of their country’s autonomy against perceived abroad interference.

Both campaigns tapped into scepticism about western institutions and appealed to voters disillusioned with their governments’ western-aligned policies. In another east European nations, candidates aligned with these narratives maintained strong ties to the Orthodox Church and conventional values, presenting themselves as protectors of national identity against liberal western ideologies. A critical reflection is that these campaigns mark circumstantial voter demographics, prioritizing marginalized or overlooked groups while framing themselves as alternatives to political elites.

It is essential to view Georgescu’s run within the broader geopolitical context. While his run does not explicitly classify as pro-Russian, its thematic alignment with anti-western, nationalist, and culturally conservative narratives mirrors strategies employed by pro-Russian candidates in another east European countries. These strategies mobilize support by leveraging dissatisfaction with the position quo, scepticism of Western influence, and an appeal to conventional values. These similarities underscore broader regional trends in political campaigning, where nationalist and populist rhetoric frequently intersects with Russian strategical interests, whether straight or indirectly. As digital platforms increasingly influence political discourse, knowing these dynamics becomes vital for safeguarding democratic processes against coordinated influence campaigns.

Georgescu’s unexpected emergence is not simply a Romanian anomaly but a case survey of the evolving nature of political influence. conventional electioneering is no longer the sole determinant of voter behavior. Instead, algorithmic manipulation, influencer-driven messaging, and undisclosed backing networks have become essential tools in modern hybrid warfare. Romania’s 2024 elections offer a glimpse into this fresh era, where democracy is shaped not by tanks and missiles but by social media algorithms, data analytics, and strategical disinformation campaigns. While Georgescu’s removal from a legal standpoint may have been justified, it nevertheless feels unfair to voters, as it removes their ability to decide, and risks being perceived as political interference. The U.S. case, where Donald Trump continued to run despite multiple legal challenges, highlights the global tensions between electoral integrity and democratic choice. This should service as a wake-up call for democratic governments worldwide: disqualifying candidates after they have gained crucial public support undermines trust in institutions. Authorities must act before the first round, not after an result they find undesirable.

For Romania’s 2025 elections—and for democracies more broadly—ensuring transparency in digital campaigning, enhancing platform accountability, and educating voters on media literacy will be critical. If governments neglect to address these vulnerabilities proactively, they hazard deepening public distrust and enabling future electoral manipulation under the guise of democracy.

Tinatin Lolomadze is a PhD candidate at Tbilisi State University, specializing in individual data protection enforcement mechanisms and European best practices. She is presently participating in the Natolin Fellowship Programme at the College of Europe, focusing on EU policies, the transformation of the east Partnership, and regional relations.


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