As the old planet order collapses and fresh spheres of influence take shape, Armenia — long seen as a Russian satellite — is rapidly becoming 1 of the most exposed democracies in the world. Pressured by authoritarian neighbours, abandoned by old alliances, and uncertain of fresh ones, Armenia now sits at the responsibility line of a global disorder defined little by law and more by natural ambition.
The dilemma faced by the country is as follows: can a tiny democracy in specified a situation reorient its abroad policy toward the West in time to last the ambitions of those surrounding it — and will anyone care if it fails? The seeming indifference of the Trump administration to democracy is another complicating factor. Does the US, in fact, inactive reward anyone for being a democracy?
For decades, Armenia was tethered to Moscow. It hosted Russian military bases, joined the Collective safety Treaty Organization (CSTO), and tolerated Kremlin influence in exchange for safety guarantees. But then Azerbaijan attacked on respective occasions. This happened first in 2020, and then in September 2022 Baku attacked the territory of the Republic of Armenia proper. This was followed by a blockade of the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh from late 2022, with Azerbaijan driving out its over 120,000 cultural Armenians in September 2023. Russia did nothing during these events. CSTO mechanisms were not triggered. The Russian peacekeeping contingent, present in the area, stood down. The alliance collapsed without firing a shot.
This betrayal marked a turning point. Armenia is now pivoting westward. The country has conducted joint exercises with the US, approved an EU accession bill in parliament, and spoke openly about leaving the CSTO. It is besides cautiously reaching out to Iran. But no of these overtures have yielded real safety guarantees. There is symbolic support, yes. But concrete protection? Not yet.
This exposes Armenia’s existential abroad policy dilemma. With the East no longer reliable, and the West seemingly not rather ready, how can Yerevan buy time, deterrence, and survival?
All of this is unfolding as 2 emboldened regional powers — Azerbaijan and Turkey — tighten the vice. Their alliance – frequently described as “two states, 1 nation” on account of their shared Turkic ethnicity – is more than rhetorical. Ankara provided crucial military support to Azerbaijan during the 2020 war, including drone technology and battlefield training. Now it is helping restructure Baku’s military along NATO lines while deepening joint infrastructure, trade and energy initiatives.
This partnership is part of a broader vision. president Erdogan’s Turkey is not simply reacting to instability – it is leveraging it. Across Syria, Libya, east Africa, and now the Caucasus and Central Asia, Ankara is asserting itself as a regional architect. Through the “Middle Corridor” initiative – a trade way linking Turkey to China via the South Caucasus – Ankara is building a sphere of influence that bypasses both Russia and Iran.
These are not isolated moves. Erdogan has embraced what any call a “neo-Ottoman” posture, projecting Turkish power wherever opportunities arise. Russia, for its part, is operating with imperial nostalgia of its own. While the 2 support opposing sides in Syria and Libya, they have demonstrated an ability to tactically coordinate, especially in regions like the Caucasus where their spheres of influence intersect.
Caught between these ambitions is Armenia – strategically located, geopolitically inconvenient, and increasingly isolated.
Internally, the situation is no little complex. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s democratic improvement agenda is under strain. Public trust has eroded, especially among those who view the government’s pivot from Russia as reckless or premature. Others see it as inevitable. Either way, Armenia’s home political cohesion is now tied straight to its abroad policy credibility – and vice versa.
The break with Russia may not carry the drama of Ukraine’s defiance or the velocity of the Baltic states’ western alignment, but it is arguably more symbolic. Armenia, for decades, was the compliant junior partner. That even this small, embattled democracy has chosen to distance itself from Moscow underscores the scale of the Kremlin’s regional decline.
Yet, Armenia’s westward pivot remains fragile. While the EU and US have expressed strong rhetorical support, they have stopped short of offering meaningful deterrence. Military assistance has been limited. No western power has drawn red lines. As seen in 2023, Azerbaijan and Turkey both appear willing to push their agendas without fear of western intervention.
Iran, though strategically crucial to Armenia, is an unpredictable and constrained ally. Facing global sanctions and regional isolation, Tehran offers limited capacity and crucial geopolitical baggage. Aligning besides closely with Iran risks alienating western backers and entrenching Armenia further in a volatile regional balancing act.
This all points to the collapse of the old safety guarantees. For decades, countries like Armenia placed their bets on large power alignments. It was believed that Russia would defend its “near abroad”; the West would reward democracy; and institutions like the UN and OSCE would manage conflict. No part of that framework inactive holds. large powers are now driven by self-interest and improvisation, not rules and commitments.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to exploit this vacuum. Its strategy, which I describe as “scrolling aggression”, involves relentless but calibrated force — capturing territory here, issuing fresh demands there, and someway mostly avoiding dramatic provocations that might trigger a global response. This gradual erosion of Armenia’s position has proven effective and hard to counter.
Despite these challenges, Yerevan retains 1 crucial advantage: its democratic credentials. In a region dominated by autocrats, Armenia’s political pluralism, civilian society and improvement agenda make it stand out. This identity could supply leverage in building deeper ties with western democracies (even if for now this applies more in Europe than the US). But this will only substance if those democracies decide that Armenia’s endurance matters.
To seize this opportunity, Armenia must adopt a strategy of pragmatic resilience. That means continuing home reforms to solidify its democratic model and strengthen institutions. These are, in fact, their own reward, regardless of the actions of outsiders. It besides means diversifying economical and energy ties distant from Russia. It means cultivating a multi-vector abroad policy that recognizes the risks of over-reliance on any single partner.
It besides means confronting hard truths: the West may never full embrace Armenia as a strategical ally. Deterrence may request to come from interior strength and regional diplomacy, alternatively than outside guarantees. To that end, Yerevan must deepen ties with emerging players — India, Gulf states, even China — while not losing sight of its core values and long-term aspirations.
The world, distracted by bigger conflicts and more visible crises, has mostly overlooked Armenia’s transformation. But what is unfolding in Yerevan is not just the realignment of 1 tiny country. It is simply a informing shot for the remainder of the world: alliances are crumbling, order is unravelling, and tiny states are one more time becoming pawns in larger games.
Whether Armenia survives this crucible will depend not only on its ability to adapt, but on whether others yet admit its strategical and symbolic significance. In a planet increasingly shaped by spheres of influence, power politics, and transactional alliances, Armenia is the test case for whether any space remains for small, democratic nations to illustration their own course.
This is not just Armenia’s story. It is the communicative of what happens erstwhile the old rules no longer apply, and no 1 comes to aid you.
David Akopyan worked for 26 years for the UN in 15 countries across all regions, including in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, holding leadership positions as UN improvement Program deputy director, country manager and Resident Representative.
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